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The 2002 Senate Farm Bill: The Ban on Packer Ownership of Livestock
Abstract
On December 13, 2001, the United States Senate approved an amendment to the Senate Farm Bill making it
unlawful for a packer to own, feed, or control livestock intended for slaughter more than fourteen days prior to
slaughter. 1 The amendment includes exemptions for packing houses owned by farmer cooperatives, and
packers with less than two percent of national slaughter. The amendment was approved 51-46, and became
part of the Senate Farm Bill.2 In early 2002, the amendment language was clarified to prohibit arrangements
that give packers ―operational, managerial, or supervisory control over the livestock, or over the farming
operation that produces the livestock, to such an extent that the producer is no longer materially participating
in the management of the operation with respect to the production of the livestock.‖3 The new language was
approved 53-46 on February 12, 2002, but did not survive the House/Senate Conference Committee on the
Farm Bill.4 More recently, two bills were introduced in the House containing language comparable to the
Senate version.5
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I.  OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUE 
On December 13, 2001, the United States Senate approved an amend-
ment to the Senate Farm Bill making it unlawful for a packer to own, feed, or 
control livestock intended for slaughter more than fourteen days prior to slaugh-
ter. 1  The amendment includes exemptions for packing houses owned by farmer 
cooperatives, and packers with less than two percent of national slaughter.  The 
amendment was approved 51-46, and became part of the Senate Farm Bill.2  In 
early 2002, the amendment language was clarified to prohibit arrangements that 
give packers ―operational, managerial, or supervisory control over the livestock, 
or over the farming operation that produces the livestock, to such an extent that 
the producer is no longer materially participating in the management of the oper-
ation with respect to the production of the livestock.‖3  The new language was 
approved 53-46 on February 12, 2002, but did not survive the House/Senate Con-
ference Committee on the Farm Bill.4  More recently, two bills were introduced 
in the House containing language comparable to the Senate version.5  
II.  REASONS FOR THE LEGISLATION 
Why has the United States Senate, on two separate occasions, voted to 
add a packer ownership prohibition to its version of the Farm Bill?  There are at 
least three major reasons that have spurred the legislation:  (1) consolidation 
amongst firms in the meatpacking industry;6 (2) the implications of the dimi-
 ________________________  
 1. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,093 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001) (text of amendment); see also 
The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 2. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,099 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001) (ratification of amendment). 
 3. 148 CONG. REC. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002) (text of amendment); see also The 
Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 4. See Epilogue infra. 
 5. H.R. 3803, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 3810, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 6. Concentration in the meatpacking industry has been a significant concern for over 
one hundred years.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, five firms controlled fifty-five per-
cent of the market.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS: 
USDA’S RESPONSE TO STUDIES ON CONCENTRATION IN THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY (Apr. 1997) 
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nished cash market for hogs and cattle in recent years due to packer-owned and 
contracted livestock;7 and (3) the inability or unwillingness of government en-
forcement agencies to address the problems. 
A. Consolidation in the Meatpacking Industry 
The meatpacking industry has consolidated rapidly over the last twenty 
years.  Table 1 illustrates the increase in the four firm concentration ratios in li-
vestock slaughter from 1980 through 1999.   
                                                                                                                                    
(GAO/RCED-97-100), available at http://www.gao.gov (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).  This situation 
led to the 1921 passage of the Packer and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C. §§181-229) which created a 
division within the United States Department of Agriculture  (―USDA‖) to ensure fair business 
practices and to detect and prevent anticompetitive behavior.  See generally, ROGER A. MCEOWEN  
& NEIL E. HARL, PRINCIPLES OF AGRICULTURAL LAW §15.02[2] (1998).  An October 1991 GAO 
report found that the industry had become even more concentrated than it was in 1921 with four 
firms controlling 70% of the meatpacking industry.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PACKERS 
AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS:  OVERSIGHT OF LIVESTOCK MARKETING COMPETITIVENESS NEEDS TO 
BE ENHANCED (Oct. 1991) (GAO/RCED-92-36), available at http://www.gao.gov (last visited 
Sept., 16, 2002).  Since then, industry concentration has intensified further.  See Table 1 infra. 
 7. See NEIL E. HARL, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE, at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/harl/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) (available under ―Papers of 
Interest‖ link) (discussing the economic consequences of regionally dominant meat packers); JOHN 
D. LAWRENCE & GLEN GRIMES, PRODUCTION AND MARKETING CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. PORK 
PRODUCERS, 11 (Iowa State Univ., Staff Paper No. 343, 2001), available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/staffppr343FNL.pdf (last visited June 3, 2002) 
(stating that a January 2001 survey suggested that 17% of hogs were bought on the cash market; 
remainder procured by some type of marketing agreement); See USDA-GIPSA, CAPTIVE SUPPLY OF 
CATTLE AND GIPSA’S REPORTING OF CAPTIVE SUPPLY, viii (Jan. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/captive_supply/captivesupplyreport.pdf (last visited June 3, 2002) 
[hereinafter USDA-GIPSA, CAPTIVE SUPPLY OF CATTLE].  ―Based on its review of the under-
lying transaction date, GIPSA has estimated that 32.3% of the total 1999 slaughter of the top four 
packers was procured through captive supply arrangements.‖  Id. 
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Table 1.  Four Firm Concentration Ratio in Livestock Slaughter (%) 
Year Cattle Steer & Heifers Cows/Bulls Hogs 
1980 28 36 10 34 
1985 39 50 17 32 
1990 42 55 18 33 
1995 69 81 28 46 
1996 66 79 29 55 
1997 68 80 31 54 
1998 70 81 33 56 
1999 70 81 32 56 
2000 69 82 32 56 
Source:   International Agricultural Trade and Development Center, University of Florida. 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the consolidation in the meatpacking in-
dustry was primarily horizontal.8  In the mid-to-late 1990s, vertical integration 
progressed rapidly.9  Packers engaged in livestock production, entered long-term 
contracts to secure livestock production, and purchased downstream firms for 
 ________________________  
 8. See James M. MacDonald & Mark Denbaly, Concentration in Agribusiness, Paper 
Presented at the Agricultural Outlook Forum 2000, Table 1 (Feb. 24, 2000) (on file with authors). 
 9. See generally C. Robert Taylor, Where’s the Beef?  Monopoly and Monopsony 
Power in the Beef Industry, Agriculture and Resource Policy Forum (Auburn University) Mar. 
2002, available at http://www.auburn.edu/~taylocr/ (available under ―Recent Reports‖ link) (dis-
cussing the impact of rapid consolidation in the meatpacking industry since 1980). 
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further processing.10  Additionally, major meatpacking firms have entered into a 
web of interlocking agreements through joint ventures and alliances.11  This con-
solidation has led to serious concerns of an imbalance of power between meat-
packers and independent producers.12 
Similar concerns in the late 1800s and early 1900s led to the passage of 
the Sherman Act13 in 1890, the Clayton Act14 in 1914 and the Packers and Stock-
yards Act (PSA)15 in 1921.  Congress finds itself in an analogous position today 
because of the structure and conduct of the contemporary meat industry. 
Some past consolidations have certainly resulted in efficiency gains that 
have been passed on to consumers.16  However, as industry structure consolidates 
vertically and horizontally, efficiency gains are less likely to be passed on to ei-
ther farmers or consumers.17  Indeed, recent data indicate that the portion of the 
retail meat dollar attributable to packers (referred to as the farm-wholesale 
spread) has trended higher since the mid-1990s, as shown in Figure 1.18 
 ________________________  
 10. See Neil E. Harl & John Lawrence, Long-Term Marketing Contracts with Packers . . 
. A Journey Through the Downside, 35 IOWA PORK PRODUCER 1, 5-7 (1998). 
 11. See generally Taylor, supra note 9, available at http://www.auburn.edu/~taylocr/ 
(available under ―Recent Reports‖ link); see also MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM HEFFERNAN, 
CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS (2002), available at  
http://www.nfu.org/documents/01_02_Concentration_report.pdf (last visited June 19, 2002). 
 12. See generally Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust:  A New Direction for Agri-
cultural Law, 75 N.D.  L. REV. 449 (1999); HARL, supra note 7, at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/harl/. 
 13. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)). 
 14. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 
(2000)). 
 15. 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (2000)). 
 16. See Taylor, supra note 9, available at http://www.auburn.edu/~taylocr/ (available 
under ―Recent Reports‖ link). 
 17. It is important to note that vertical and horizontal integration benefits consumers 
only if any economies derived from the integration are passed on to consumers.  That outcome is 
likely only if competition is present and competitive markets are functioning well.  Instead, any 
efficiency gains could be passed on to shareholders or used to pad costs within the firm.  In any 
event, the higher the level of concentration and vertical integration, the greater the risk of unaccept-
able market conduct. 
 18. Taylor, supra note 9, available at http://www.auburn.edu/~taylocr/ (available under 
―Recent Reports‖ link). 
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Figure 1.  The Farm to Wholesale Spread in Beef  
(USDA Data Adjusted for Inflation) 
 
In the last few years, the efficiency gains have been arguably negligible 
because economies of scale and scope can be achieved at much lower volume 
levels than are evidenced today.19  Concerns of market power, thus, rise in impor-
tance. 
In a competitive market, the farm-wholesale price spread should decrease 
as per-unit slaughter costs decrease.  In other words, as slaughter costs decrease 
due to efficiency gains, a competitive market would force firms to pass those 
savings on to consumers.  Figure 1 shows that this was indeed the case through-
out the 1980s and the early 1990s.  
Since the mid 1990s, however, the farm-wholesale price spread has 
trended strongly upward.  This trend is inconsistent with what economists would 
expect in a competitive market, and should result in higher gross income for the 
 ________________________  
 19. As of 1997, the four largest firms controlled about 80% of cattle slaughter, but there 
were twenty-two plants with the highest level of production accounting for 80% of all production.  
Assuming these plants reflected scale economies, achieving such economies would require less 
than 3.7% of the market by each plant.  For pork, the thirty-one largest plants yielded 88% of pro-
duction.  Again assuming that these plants reflected scale economies, achieving such economies 
could be reached with each plant having slightly less than 3% of the market.  Consequently, a high-
ly dispersed ownership and unconcentrated market would be consistent with the largest size of 
plants in both pork and beef packing.  See Peter C. Carstensen, Concentration and the Destruction 
of Competition in Agricultural Markets:  The Case for Change in Public Policy, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 
531, 537 (2000). 
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dominant packers — a fact which is confirmed by high profits being reported by 
the dominant firms in meat packing the past several years.
20
 
The meatpacking industry explains the increased farm-wholesale price 
spread in a manner that does not implicate market power by asserting that they 
are adding value and/or realizing efficiency gains by moving to larger and larger 
slaughter operations and that slaughter costs are less for the leaner animals that 
are now produced.
21
  As for the value-added claim, the USDA Economic Re-
search Service (―ERS‖) calculates the spread for a standard animal so that the 
spread will reflect only price changes.
22
  Likewise, even if meat quality improves 
over time, there should be no long-run trend in the farm-wholesale price spread 
for given slaughter costs.
23
  On the efficiency claim, economic theory predicts 
that efficiency gains that are realized in a competitive market would result in the 
farm-wholesale spread trending downward, not upward as it has since the mid-to-
late 1990s.
24
  The implication is that the meatpacking industry is less competitive 
today than it has been in the past.
25
 
B. The Impact of Contract-Supplied Livestock. 
A truly competitive market is characterized by many buyers and sellers.26  
The economic research is clear that when the number of buyers is reduced, 
 ________________________  
 20. See Taylor, supra note 9, available at http://www.auburn.edu/~taylocr/ (available 
under ―Recent Reports‖ link). 
 21. See id. at 2, available at http://www.auburn.edu/~taylocr/ (available under ―Recent 
Reports‖ link). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. The upward trend for much of the 1990s and into 2001 is too strong and too persis-
tent to be explained by short-term spikes in prices, spreads, production or competition with other 
meats.  See James M. MacDonald & Michael E. Ollinger, Consolidation in Meatpacking: Causes 
and Concerns, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, June-July 2000, at 23.  Also, the article states,  
―[A] long-term increase would be troubling.  Increasing 
concentration in other sectors of the economy has often re-
flected intense competition and frequently led to falling 
costs and prices for the concentrating firms.  But after an 
industry consolidates, when few firms face each other in a 
stable environment, competition may often become less in-
tense.‖   
The USDA report concluded by asking the question, ―[a]s consolidation is completed, will packers 
successfully limit price competition among themselves and maintain 1999’s high spreads?‖  Id. 
 26. See, e.g., DOUGLAS F. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 22-31 
(2d ed. 1984); RICHARD LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 296-317 (7th ed. 1984); USDA-GIPSA, PRICE 
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downward pressure on price paid to sellers results.27  Further, as marketplace 
volume decreases, the market is far more susceptible to intentional or uninten-
tional actions taken by the dominant buyers.28  
This is the case for the cash market in hogs and cattle.  Both sectors have 
three buyers at best, and one at worst, in any given geographic procurement 
area.29  If a plant shuts down or a packer pulls out of the market for other reasons, 
prices suffer.  Glenn Grimes, an agricultural economist with the University of 
Missouri, reported in August 2001 that 83% of hogs were committed to packers 
due to ownership or contract arrangements.30  This scenario leaves a very thin 
open market volume in which 17% of the hogs were traded in the open market.  
The beef industry is also trending towards thinner open market volume.  A report 
released by USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers & Stockyards Administration on 
January 11, 2002, revealed that 32.3% of the annual cattle slaughter was commit-
                                                                                                                                    
DETERMINATION IN SLAUGHTER CATTLE PROCUREMENT (1996), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/packers/conc-rpt.htm (last visited June 4, 2002) [hereinafter 
USDA-GIPSA, PRICE DETERMINATION]. 
 27. See, e.g., James M. MacDonald et al., Competition and Prices in USDA Commodity 
Procurement, 69 S. ECON. J. (forthcoming 2002); RICHARD J.  SEXTON, FED CATTLE PROCUREMENT 
INVESTIGATION IN THE TEXAS PANHANDLE (1999), at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/programspsp/txpeer/RichardSexton.pdf (last visited June 6, 2002) (peer 
review of the GIPSA investigation of cattle procurement in the Texas Panhandle). 
 28. Concerning the impact of concentration in the hog industry, a group of Purdue Uni-
versity economists have stated,  
We see evidence of increased concentration . . . to the point where public vigil-
ance is warranted.  Concentration indices are high and may be reaching the 
point where markdown pricing on hogs will be significant and place producers 
at a clear disadvantage . . . .  Two major policy options are anti-trust activity on 
the one hand and increasing the market power of hog producers on the other.  
PHILIP PAARLBERG ET AL., STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND MARKET PERFORMANCE IN AGRICULTURE:  
CRITICAL ISSUES AND CONCERNS ABOUT CONCENTRATION IN THE PORK INDUSTRY 11 (Purdue Univ., 
Staff Paper No. 99-14, 1999) (submitted as testimony to the United States House of Representa-
tives, Committee on the Judiciary, Oct. 20, 1999) (transcript available with author). 
 29. See HARL, supra note 7, at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/harl (discussing the 
economic consequences of regionally dominant meat packers). 
 30. See LAWRENCE & GRIMES, supra note 7, available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/staffppr343FNL.pdf (stating that a January 2001 
survey suggested that 17% of hogs were bought on the cash market; remainder procured by some 
type of marketing agreement). 
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ted to packers through ownership or contract arrangements.31  Twenty-five per-
cent of that captive supply number (8% of annual slaughter) was packer owned.32  
Thus, the opportunity exists for buyers to manipulate the open market 
due to their position as dominant buyers combined with the decreasing volume of 
those markets.33  The motive is undeniable because any exercise of market power 
likely results in decreased procurement prices for packers in both hogs and cat-
tle.34  
Another key aspect of both the motive and opportunity to strategically 
affect the market through packer owned and contracted livestock supplies arises 
from the ability of packers to bid conservatively for livestock or strategically to 
pull out of the market altogether.  When packers have guaranteed supplies for 
which they need not bid, they have far less incentive to bid aggressively for open 
market cattle and hogs due to the comfort margin.35  More significantly, packers 
have an incentive to schedule the processing of packer owned and contracted 
livestock in order to affect price trends negatively.  Essentially, they have a sig-
nificantly enhanced ability to pull out of the market while keeping plant capacity 
at one hundred percent.36  
 ________________________  
 31. See USDA-GIPSA, CAPTIVE SUPPLY OF CATTLE, supra note 7, at viii, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/captive_supply/captivesupplyreport.pdf.  ―Based on its review of 
the underlying transaction date, GIPSA has estimated that 32.3% of the total 1999 slaughter of the 
top four packers was procured through captive supply arrangements.‖  Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. A packer practice of negotiating for larger numbers of livestock several days in 
advance of shipment gives packers opportunities to use such livestock in affecting prices paid for 
such livestock. 
 34. In mid-April 2001, it was reported that a deliberate packer strategy to decrease 
slaughter so as to decrease beef supplies and increase packing plant cutouts and margins contri-
buted to lower cash cattle prices.  See Rod Smith, Cattle to Rally, Then Retreat; Hogs, Eggs Down; 
Butter, Cheese Up, FEEDSTUFFS, Apr. 16, 2001, at 22.   
 35. A significant question is whether such a practice violates the Packers and Stockyards 
Act (―PSA‖).  Indeed, on December 26, 2001, the Federal District Court for the Middle District of 
Alabama certified a nationwide class action against IBP on the legal question of whether IBP’s use 
of captive supply violates §§ 192(a), (d) and (e) of the PSA.  See Pickett v. IBP, Inc., No. 96-A-
1103-N, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22453 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2001).  The claim is that IBP’s private-
ly held store of livestock (via captive supply) allows IBP to avoid reliance on auction-price pur-
chases in the open market for most of their supply.  IBP then uses this leverage, the claim is, to 
depress the market prices for independent producers on the cash and forward markets in violation 
of the PSA.  The court specifically noted that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they possessed a 
―workable economic analysis‖ to determine the effect of captive supply on cash market prices.  Id. 
At *30. 
 36. A 1996 USDA-GIPSA funded report predicted this result by stating,  
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The motive for strategic behavior by dominant firms in the hog and cattle 
sectors is further increased by the fact that the cash market is the primary price 
discovery point for formula contracts and marketing agreements.  Formula con-
tracts and marketing agreements are generally tied to the cash market through 
some sort of formula.  Thus if the cash market declines, packers pay less for li-
vestock whether procured through the cash market or contract.37   
A significant number of economic studies of the issue have found that 
increases in supplies of livestock that are committed to the dominant packing 
firms through ownership or contract are correlated with lower prices in the cash 
                                                                                                                                    
What are the implications (of increased ownership and contracting) for spot 
markets?  Terminal and auction markets for market hogs, dealers, and order 
buyers would decline rapidly in volume, following current trends.  Spot mar-
kets for the residual supply and demand would become more thinly traded, and 
probably more volatile as the ―shock absorber‖ for unanticipated changes in 
supply and demand.  Price reporting would become more difficult, and concern 
about price manipulation would escalate as relatively small changes in the be-
havior of large market participants more likely could have an impact on re-
ported market prices.  If long-term arrangements become dominant, the proba-
ble impacts would include: . . . less spot market volume, with associated prob-
lems of more limited market access for small producers and increased short-
term price volatility for their hogs . . . . 
Marvin Hayenga et al., Vertical Coordination in Hog Production, in  CONCENTRATION IN THE RED 
MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY (1996), available at  
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/packers/conc-rpt.htm (last visited June 5, 2002). 
 37. On the incentive for packers to manipulate the market to which their contracts are 
tied, Virginia Tech University agricultural economist Wayne Purcell stated the following:   
Contracts with a formula arrangement where the base price is either a cash mar-
ket in which the packer/processor is an active buyer or a plant average price paid 
for the week prior to delivery offer the wrong incentives. Whether buyers at-
tempt to manipulate the cash market to which the contract price is tied is some-
what immaterial because the incentive to do so is present and is undeniable. 
Wayne D. Purcell, Contracts and Captive Supplies in Livestock:  Why We Are Here, Implications, 
and Policy Issues, Report Presented at the Denver Captive Supply Forum (Sept. 2000), at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/forum/purcell.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).    
  On March 15, 2002, Senator Enzi (R-WY) introduced S. 2021 into the Senate in an 
attempt to address the price manipulation problem.  S. 2021 would amend the Packers and Stock-
yards Act by prohibiting certain kinds of forward contracts.  The legislation focuses on formula 
pricing in forward contracts and prohibits contracts that do not have a firm base price equated to a 
fixed dollar amount at the time a contract is signed.  The bill permits prices based on a futures 
market price and allows for premiums paid for factors outside the packers’ control such as grade 
and product quality.  The bill establishes criteria to ensure that formula-pricing and forward mar-
keting contracts are traded in open markets and, to accomplish that end, requires that any buyer and 
seller be given the chance to participate.  In the event of blind bids, more than one bid must be 
solicited.  In addition, buyers and sellers are permitted to witness bids that are offered and accepted.  
See S. 2021, 107th  Cong. (2002). 
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market.38  Though some have claimed that correlation is not causation, those ar-
guments are not credible.  Further, it is important to note that the economic stu-
dies are not able to detect collusion or intent to manipulate a market because 
economists do not have the tools or the data for such inquiries.  The strongest 
result is a consistent correlation between the problematic or strategic conduct and 
a negative result. 
Lastly, evidence of how market power can be used by meat packers can 
be found in bidding practices.  The few dominant buyers, if they buy in the same 
area, can develop practices that ultimately minimize competition.  For example, 
in the Texas Panhandle region, the following particularly troubling aspects of 
bidding practices have been demonstrated: 
The convention of bidding only whole dollar amounts per hundred 
pounds of live cattle weight.   University of California-Davis agricultural econ-
omist Richard Sexton estimated that this practice cost producers approximately 
$25 million in lost revenues during the roughly 15-month period of data collec-
tion for the Panhandle study.39   
Use of a queuing mechanism to distribute cattle to buyers, wherein 
the first bidder has priority in the case of tie bids.  A related problem is that 
the first bidder in line is given an opportunity to revise his bid in the event that 
someone bids higher.  Thus, the key feature in securing the cattle is not to make a 
high bid but, rather, to secure the first bid.  It need not be the buyer's "best" bid 
because the buyer will be able to revise the bid in the event that a higher bid is 
received.  It is probably easy for buyers to agree to queuing conventions among 
 ________________________  
 38. For example, a report of the USDA Grain Inspection, Packers & Stockyards Admin-
istration has found that through contractual arrangements (forward contracting, marketing agree-
ments and packer-fed cattle), packers can obtain livestock two or more weeks before slaughter.  
The report estimated that a 1% increase in a packer’s inventory of forward contracted cattle on any 
given day is associated with lower prices (three to five cents per hundredweight) paid for cattle in 
the cash market.  With captive supplies running as high as 70% in some weeks, the economic im-
pact could be as high as $25 to $50 per head of cattle sold.  Clement E. Ward et al., Role of Captive 
Supplies in Beef Packing, in CONCENTRATION IN THE RED MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY (1996), availa-
ble at http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/packers/conc-rpt.htm#chap3 (last visited June 5, 2002). 
 39. SEXTON, supra note 27, at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/programspsp/txpeer/RichardSexton.pdf (last visited June 6, 2002) (peer 
review of the GIPSA investigation of cattle procurement in the Texas Panhandle).  A similar con-
vention by the stockbrokers who were market makers on the NASDAQ stock exchange resulted in 
civil antitrust damages of more than $1 billion as to those stock brokers.  In re NASDAQ Market-
Makers Antitrust Litigation, 176 F.R.D. 99 (S.D. N.Y.  Oct. 14, 1997).  For additional discussion of 
the case, see Price Fixing:  $1 Billion Settlement is Approved in Suit Against NASDAQ Market-
Makers, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1885 (Nov. 12, 1998). 
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themselves.  These mechanisms, which would be difficult to maintain in a com-
petitive environment, serve effectively to allocate the cattle among the packers.  
Additionally, packer-to-packer trades can be a method of collusion.  
When packers own and raise livestock, they can sell that livestock to other pack-
ers thereby both affecting the market price and communicating that price to each 
other.  Smithfield Foods, for example, purchased Murphy Farms and Carroll 
Foods.  Many of the former Murphy hogs were, and continue to be, sold to IBP.  
This constitutes ongoing price communication between Smithfield and IBP via 
sales transactions that appear relatively innocent upon first observation.40   
C. The Effectiveness of Government Enforcement Agencies 
The current enforcement regime has proved unequal to the task of pro-
moting competition and reducing the anticompetitive effects of both industry 
structure and industry conduct.41  Case law and past USDA administrative deci-
sions have narrowed the scope of the PSA dramatically.42  Further, USDA’s 
 ________________________  
 40. The proposed legislation would remove the ability of packers to manipulate the 
market in this manner.  Other legislative remedies would be appropriate for other practices.   
 41. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS:  ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO IMPROVE INVESTIGATIONS OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 4-5 (Sept. 2000)(GAO/RCED-
00-242), available at http://www.gao.gov (last visited Sept. 6,  2002) (summarizing a 1997 report 
of USDA’s Office of Inspector General concerning the Packers and Stockyards Act that found 
serious problems in the enforcement of the law with respect to anticompetitive practices).  The 
GAO report concluded that despite substantial reorganization, serious problems remained.  Id. at 
21-22.  See also Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director of Food and Agricultural Issues of the U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the 
Courts, Senate Judiciary Committee, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/oldsite/9252000_ld.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2002). 
 42. See, e.g., Corona Livestock Auction v. USDA, 607 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1979) (revers-
ing order of Secretary on basis that findings of fact made without the factually based evaluation 
necessary to show required injury); Cent. Coast Meats, Inc. v. USDA, 541 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 
1976) (stating Secretary must show that conduct in question is likely to produce the sort of injury 
the Act is designed to prevent); Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1968) (set-
ting aside judicial officer’s finding that a regional discount coupon promotion violated the Act; 
court held the Secretary did not have authority to regulate various sales methods); Swift & Co. v. 
Wallace, 105 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1939) (setting aside Secretary’s order requiring packer to cease and 
desist from giving ―unreasonable preferences‖ in price and credit terms; court held Secretary failed 
to take into account relevant factors of competition and that packer had not acted in bad faith); 
Griffin v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Va. 2002) (upholding defendant’s 
practice of acquiring hogs through contractual arrangements and direct ownership on basis that 
defendant engaged in such transactions with purpose of competing more effectively and because 
plaintiff’s offered only speculative damages); In re Palmer, 50 Agric. Dec. 1753 (1991) (Judicial 
Officer abandoned severe sanctions policy in favor of case by case analysis).  The court in Griffin 
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Grain Inspection, Packers & Stockyards Administration has lacked the resources 
and talent effectively to litigate major competition cases, or minor ones, against 
highly paid and experienced lawyers for the industry.  In fact, the USDA has not 
won a major competition case for at least two decadesdespite the fact that 
USDA believed certain practices were illegal.  For example, while the USDA 
believes that the bid queuing practice (right of first refusal) discussed above mi-
nimizes price competition, and has held that such a practice does violate the PSA, 
that position has not been sustained on appeal.43  In addition, the USDA deter-
mined that Cargill/Excel changed its premium structure for hogs in 1997 and 1998 
without telling hog producers.  The result was a loss to those producers of approx-
imately $2.9 million.  The administrative law judge for the USDA agreed, but re-
fused to assess a penalty.44  While the USDA is appealing that refusal, it is clear that 
the deterrent factor is severely lacking. 
                                                                                                                                    
made no effort to analyze anti-competitive effects of defendant’s conduct, failed to note that PSA 
proscribes packer conduct having ―the purpose or. . .  effect of manipulating or controlling prices, 
or . . . creating a monopoly‖ as stated in 7 U.S.C. §192(e) (2000), and failed to note that other 
courts have held that PSA does not require proof of any particular injury (emphasis added).  See 
Bowman v. USDA, 363 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1966) (quoting Daniels v. United States, 242 F.2d 39, 
42 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 939 (1957)). 
 43. See IBP, Inc. v. Glickman, 187 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1999).  While the Eighth 
Circuit reversed the USDA’s decision, the court recognized that the right of first refusal did reduce 
the incentive for competitors to bid.  The court reasoned that the PSA’s language requires that a 
practice or device be unfairly or unjustly discriminatory and not merely discriminatory.  The court’s 
reasoning appears flawed inasmuch as the court, to arrive at its holding, relied on the fact that the 
packer paid more for the cattle at issue that it did for other cattle.  Without significantly more in-
formation concerning the mechanics of the residual market, the comparison by the court appears 
meaningless.  Thus, by having a right of first refusal and controlling the contract supply, the packer 
could also suppress price competition in the spot market precisely because it has a lock on the 
contract market.  While the court claimed to recognize that the PSA prohibited the conduct at issue 
based on the conduct’s potential to undermine competitive markets, the court actually required 
proof of actual harm which was not developed in the case record.  Thus, the court concluded that 
the right of first refusal involved in the case did not potentially suppress or reduce competition 
sufficient to be proscribed by the Act.   
 44. In re Excel, 61 Agric. Dec. ___ (2002) (forthcoming). 
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III. THE PACKER OWNERSHIP AMENDMENT 
A. The December 13, 2001 Version 
The version of the ban that passed the Senate on December 13, 2001, and 
became a part of the Senate Farm Bill45 amended 7 U.S.C. § 192 (§ 202 of the 
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921) by adding a new subsection (f) as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any packer with respect to livestock, meats, 
meat food products, or livestock products in unmanufactured form, 
or for any live poultry dealer with respect to live poultry, to: 
(f) Own, feed, or control livestock intended for slaughter (for more 
than 14 days prior to slaughter and acting through the packer or a 
person that directly or indirectly controls, or is controlled by or un-
der common control with, the packer), except that this subsection 
shall not apply to –  
(1)  a cooperative or entity owned by a cooperative, if a majority 
of the ownership interest in the cooperative is held by active coop-
erative members that –  
(A) own, feed, or control livestock; and  (B) provide the 
livestock to the cooperative for slaughter; or 
(2)  a packer that is owned or controlled by producers of a 
type of livestock, if during a calendar year the packer slaughters 
less than 2 percent of the head of that type of livestock slaugh-
tered in the United States . . .
46
  
 ________________________  
 45. See The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 
107th Cong. (2001). 
 46. See id. (amendment No. 2534). 
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In a paper dated January 14, 2002, eight economists, none of whom are 
lawyers, interpreted the legislation as prohibiting pork and beef packers from 
making any arrangement with livestock producers to acquire their livestock more 
than two weeks prior to slaughter.47  The economists opined that the prohibition 
would include forward contracts, marketing agreements, contracts containing any 
promise of delivery, and would result in producers having no legally assured 
market for their livestock before the last two weeks preceding slaughter.48  The 
economists further assumed, based on their interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage that alliances in which packers participate with producers would also be 
banned.49  Based on their interpretations and assumptions concerning the statuto-
ry language, the economists predicted that the beef and pork sectors would be-
come less efficient and less competitive due to the loss of contracting rights and 
alliances.50   
 ________________________  
 47. See Dillon Feuz et al., Comments on Economic Impacts of Proposed Legislation to 
Prohibit Beef and Pork Packer Ownership, Feeding, or Control of Livestock 1 (Jan. 14, 2002) (un-
published paper), available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/Lawrence/Acrobat/JohnsonAmendment.pdf (last visited June 
5, 2002). 
 48. Id.  
 49. See id.  
 50. See id. Interestingly, most of the authors of the report have significant ties to the 
livestock packing industry and several have received compensation from livestock packers for 
consulting work done on behalf of the packers.  Indeed, at the time the paper was released, one of 
the authors was serving as an expert witness for IBP, Inc. in a federal class action lawsuit involving 
the legal issue of whether IBP’s use of captive supply violates §§192(a), (d) and (e) of the Packers 
and Stockyards Act.  See Pickett, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22453.  The authors did not disclose any 
of these facts.  The non-disclosure concerns surrounding the economists’ paper spurred, at least in 
part, the introduction of legislation into the Kansas Senate on February 12, 2002, requiring public 
disclosure of such matters.  Senate Bill 570 would have prohibited, beginning, January 1, 2003, any 
unclassified employee of a state university from acting as a consultant unless the employee files a 
disclosure statement with the local information officer of such university or at a location designated 
by the Kansas Board of Regents within ten business days after the contract had been signed.  The 
statement would be an open record and retained for five years after the employee had left the uni-
versity.  S.B. 570, 2001-2002 Leg., 2002 Sess. (Kan. 2002), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2002/570.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).  On February 15, 2002, 
the chair of the Senate Committee on Elections and Local Government cancelled the hearing on the 
bill. 
  House Bill 3013 was introduced on March 8, 2002, containing language nearly 
identical to S.B. 570, but adding language protecting information covered by the attorney-client and 
doctor-patient privilege.  H.B. 3013, 2001-2002 Leg., 2002 Sess. (Kan. 2002), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2002/3013.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).  A hearing on the bill 
was held on March 21, and the House Ethics and Elections Committee passed the bill the same day. 
See Full History of Bill 3013, available at http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-bin/billtrack/index.cgi 
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1. Construing the Statutory Language – The Meaning of “Control” 
In their paper, the economists base their entire analysis, without any sup-
porting documentation, on the assumption that the statutory prohibition of ―con-
trol‖ of livestock will prohibit all types of marketing contracts, including forward 
contracts.51  They then focus their entire argument against the proposed legisla-
tion based on claims of harm to various kinds of contractual arrangements used 
in the livestock industry.52  Interestingly, however, the economists never once 
even suggest that packers need to actually own or control livestock in order to 
accomplish any of the specific objectives that they identify as crucial to achiev-
                                                                                                                                    
(last visited Sept. 6, 2002).  However, H.B. 3013 was not allowed to be debated on the House floor 
by the speaker (who is from Manhattan, the home of Kansas State University) and remained on the 
calendar for the remainder of the legislative session, where it formally died on May 16, 2002.  See 
Full History of Bill 3013, available at http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-bin/billtrack/index.cgi (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2002).   
  House Bill 2959, a bill concerning the Kansas Open Records Act and disclosure of 
information, was in the Senate Utilities Committee when H.B. 3013 was heard in the House.  The 
Senate Utilities Committee incorporated the consulting disclosure language of H.B. 3013 into H.B. 
2959, but the consulting disclosure language was opposed strongly behind the scenes by the Presi-
dent’s Office at Kansas State University and the Kansas Board of Regents.  The Senate majority 
leader (also from Manhattan) refused to allow H.B. 2959 to be debated in the Senate, and the bill 
died on May 15, 2002.  See Full History of Bill 2959, available at http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-
bin/billtrack/index.cgi (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).   
  On May 7, 2002, the consulting disclosure language of H.B. 2959 was added to S.B. 
647, a bill concerning higher education.  On May 8, the House passed the bill in final action and 
sent it to the Education Conference Committee.  See Full History of Bill 647, available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-bin/billtrack/index.cgi (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).  House and 
Senate rules require language to be passed in one cameral before it can be a subject in any confe-
rence committee.  House and Senate Utility Conference Committee members had agreed to insert 
both the consulting disclosure language and the utility security language into the conference com-
mittee report on Senate Bill 112.  This was done on May 8, 2002, but the speaker (again from Man-
hattan) would not allow the conference committee report to be voted on.  On May 14, the speaker 
of the House allowed the House to vote on S.B. 112.  See Full History of Bill 112, available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-bin/billtrack/index.cgi (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).   The bill 
passed, but Senators were informed by the Senate majority leader (from Manhattan) that the bill 
would not run on the Senate floor unless the consulting disclosure language was removed.  Mean-
while, the conference committee on S.B. 647 was working on compromise language that the Kan-
sas Board of Regents and the Governor supported.  The bill containing the compromise language 
eventually passed both the House and Senate and was signed by the Governor on May 30, 2002.  
See Full History of Bill 647, available at http://www.kslegislature.org/cgi-bin/billtrack/index.cgi 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2002).  The compromise language requires disclosure only in very limited 
situations. 
 51. See Feuz et al., supra note 47, available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/Lawrence/Acrobat/JohnsonAmendment.pdf. 
 52. See generally id. (discussing implications of prohibiting agreements). 
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ing economic efficiency and a competitive market.  The clear implication of their 
argument is that the prohibition of actual packer ownership of livestock does not 
raise any significant efficiency or competition concerns. 
Importantly, the amendment’s primary sponsor, Senator Tim Johnson 
(D-SD), offered a formal clarification in the Senate that the word ―control‖ con-
tained in subsection (f) of the proposed amendment is to be interpreted in the 
context of ownership.53  Thus, the congressional intent is that the amendment is 
not to prohibit contracts for future delivery of livestock, but instead prevent 
packers from owning cattle outright, through a subsidiary, or through arrange-
ments (contractual or otherwise) that give them operational control over livestock 
except within the last two weeks before slaughter.54 
From a legal standpoint, ―control‖ issues arise frequently in an agency 
context in situations involving the need to distinguish between an ―independent 
contractor‖ and an ―employee‖ for reasons including, but not limited to, liability 
and taxation.55  Typically, the existence of an agency relationship is a question of 
fact for a jury to decide.56  At its very essence, whether a relationship is an inde-
pendent contractor relationship or a master-servant relationship depends on 
whether the entity for whom the work is performed has reserved the right to con-
trol the means by which the work is to be conducted.57  Under many production 
contract settings, the integrator controls both the mode and manner of the farm-
ing operation.58  The producer no longer makes many of the day-to-day manage-
 ________________________  
 53. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,660-61 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. John-
son). 
 54. See id. at S13,661.  
 55. An employee is generally one who works subject to the control of the employer.  
This usually requires control both with respect to the manner and means of performing the particu-
lar job task.  In these situations, the employer is responsible for the acts of the employee committed 
in the scope of the employee’s employment.  If an employer-employee relationship exists, the 
employer is responsible for withholding and employment taxes.  See, e.g., Déjà Vu Entm’t Enters. 
v. United States, 1 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Minn. 1998) (employers of an adult entertainment estab-
lishment need not pay employment taxes if a reasonable basis for not treating the performers as 
employees is established under Section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 56. See Carlton v. Ala. Dairy Queen, Inc., 529 So. 2d 921, 923 (Ala. 1988). 
 57. See, e.g., MCEOWEN & HARL, supra note 6, §11.09[1] (discussing the employer’s 
liability to third persons for acts of employees and the master-servant or independent contractor 
relationship).   
 58. See generally Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Stevens, 783 So. 2d 804, 808-809 (Ala. 2000) 
(holding Tyson to be in agency relationship with farmer under hog production contract because 
Tyson specified where hog houses were to be located, the size of each house, mandated the imple-
mentation of a waste-management system, visited the farm weekly, provided the hogs, hog feed 
and veterinary supplies and care). 
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ment decisions while the integrator controls the production-to-marketing cycle.  
The integrator is also typically given twenty-four hour access to the producer’s 
facilities.59  Conversely, forward contracts, formula pricing agreements, and other 
types of marketing contracts typically do not give the integrator managerial or 
operational control of the farming operation or control of the production-to-
marketing cycle.  Instead, such contracts commonly provide the packer with only 
a contractual right to receive delivery of livestock in the future.  While it is not 
uncommon that livestock marketing contracts contain quality specifications, most 
of those contract provisions relate exclusively to the amount of any premium or 
discount in the final contract payment for livestock delivered under the contract.  
Importantly, the manner in which quality requirements tied to price premiums are 
to be satisfied remains within the producer’s control.60  Accordingly, such mar-
keting contracts would likely be held to be beyond the scope of the legislation’s 
ban on packer ownership or control of livestock more than two weeks before 
slaughter.  Thus, a packer would still have the ability to coordinate supply chains 
and assure markets for livestock producers through contractual arrangements 
provided the contracts do not give the packer operational and managerial control 
over the livestock producer’s production activities. 
2. Application to Cooperatives   
Whether the statutory language applies to packer ―alliances‖ with pro-
ducers would also be judged under the same standard.  If a packer merely pro-
vides marketing expertise and advantages to producer-members of the alliance, 
but does not exercise control over the manner in which the livestock are to be 
produced, insufficient control would be present to subject the activity to the own-
ership ban under either an agency or partnership theory.  This interpretation 
comports with congressional intent.  For example, Senator Grassley (R-IA) stated 
in debate over the amendment that ―[I]t has never been our intent to prevent co-
operatives from engaging in relationships with packers, and the amendment does 
not do that . . . .  Co-op members . . . can freely commit all or a portion of their 
 ________________________  
 59. See generally id. (discussing Tyson’s agency relationship with farmer). 
 60. For example, under a formula pricing cattle contract, cattle feeders must adapt their 
feeder cattle procurement and cattle feeding management practices to produce slaughter cattle that 
can earn premiums in accordance with the price grid specified in the contract.  Under these types of 
marketing contracts, the cattle feeder remains responsible for making the managerial decisions 
necessary to receive any price premiums specified in the contract.  The packer does not gain sub-
stantial operational control over the cattle feeder’s production activities. 
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cattle for slaughter without violating this amendment.  The reason is that the 
packer . . . exercises no operational control over livestock production.‖61  
3. Comparable State Legislation  
The packer ownership amendment is also comparable to existing state 
legislation in several significant livestock producing states.62  For example, an 
Iowa statute prohibits any processor of beef or pork from owning, controlling or 
operating a feedlot in Iowa in which hogs or cattle are fed for slaughter.63  The 
legislation, however, does not prevent a processor from contracting for the pur-
chase of hogs or cattle.64  The provision has never been held to prohibit packers 
from entering into forward contracts, formula pricing agreements or other types 
of marketing arrangements with livestock producers so long as control of the 
farming or ranching operation remains vested in the producer.65 
The Minnesota provision takes the position that livestock feeding is en-
gaging in farming and, thus, is covered by the corporate farming statute.66   
Nebraska law prohibits direct or indirect packer ownership of livestock 
more than five days before slaughter, and has not been held applicable to any 
type of livestock marketing agreement. 67  Again, the key to understanding the 
scope of the statutory provision lies in determining whether the producer remains 
in decision making control of the farming operation. 
The South Dakota provision is contained in the state constitution as a 
1998 amendment prohibiting non-family farm corporate ownership of land or 
livestock. 68   
 ________________________  
 61. 147 CONG. REC. S13,661 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Grassley) 
(emphasis added). 
 62. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 9H.2 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 500.24(3) (Supp. 2001); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 54-2604 (Supp. 2001); S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 21-24 (Supp. 2000).  On May 16, 
2002, the Federal District Court for the District of South Dakota, in a highly suspect opinion, ruled 
the 1998 amendment an unconstitutional violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. See S.D. Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 202 F. 
Supp. 2d 1020 (D.S.D. 2002).   
 63. See IOWA CODE § 9H.2 (2001). 
 64. See id. 
 65. Indeed, many various types of marketing contracts are presently in use in Iowa. 
 66. See MINN. STAT. § 500.24(3) (1990 and Supp. 2001). 
 67. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 54-2604 (Supp. 2001). 
 68. See S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 21-24 (Supp. 2000).  On May 16, 2002, the Federal 
District Court for the District of South Dakota, in a highly suspect opinion, ruled the 1998 amend-
ment an unconstitutional violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution.  South Dakota Farm Bureau, et. al. v. Hazeltine, 202 F.Supp. 2d 
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Importantly, the dire consequences the economists predict will occur if 
the packer ownership amendment ultimately becomes law have not arisen in the 
livestock sectors of Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, or South Dakota since enactment 
of the comparable legislation in those states.69 
4. Contractual Arrangements, Livestock Markets and the Proposed Legislation 
Contractual arrangements and various kinds of alliances can contribute 
significantly to the development of efficient and competitive livestock produc-
tion.  Importantly, the amendment exempts small firms slaughtering less than two 
percent of any type of livestock.70  This is apparently designed to allow small 
firms and new entrants to experiment and develop their products without having 
to be concerned about the legal details of the relationship.71  The legislation also 
exempts farmer cooperatives where the members are themselves feeders.72  This 
expands the range of opportunity for developing new and creative solutions to the 
challenge of developing improved meat products.  In addition, large packers still 
would have available a full range of contractual opportunities to obtain specific 
types of livestock designed to meet specific needs.  Moreover, such contracts 
could be drafted to include future delivery times and other elements that facilitate 
the coordination of the packer and the producer.  Thus, contracts that do not im-
pose control over the producer can still provide all the benefits of coordination 
and end product specification that the economists identify as desirable elements 
of current arrangements.  Indeed, it is likely that most contracts and marketing 
agreements would not necessarily have to be changed at all. 
The central challenge for the very competent lawyers for those buyers 
that currently use agreements to manage the actual day-to-day operation of pro-
ducers will be to develop contracts that define the characteristics that are to be 
delivered without unlawfully limiting the freedom of the producer to select the 
methods and means of producing those results.  The packers, if they are not en-
gaged in strategic conduct or manipulative behavior, should not have any prob-
lem in defining the objectives they seek and leaving it to the producer to achieve 
the desired result.  Indeed, a result-oriented system of contracting will free pro-
                                                                                                                                    
1020 (D. S.D. 2002). 
 69. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,661 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001) (remarks by Sen. Johnson). 
 70. See The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 
107th Cong. (2002) (amendment S.A. 2837 § (a)) (explaining exceptions to the packer ownership 
ban in the original proposed language).  
 71. See 147 CONG. REC. S13,661 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001). 
 72. See S. 1731 (amendment S.A. 2837 § (a)) (exempting farms owned by cooperatives 
to feed livestock). 
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ducers to substitute livestock from third parties when that is more efficient and 
practical within the context of the contractually required results.  This could have 
the effect of enhancing competition and fairness in the production of livestock 
because the packers would not be as able to play one seller against another by 
refusing to buy directly.     
B. The February 12, 2002 Version 
After passage of the original language on December 13, 2001, concerns 
were raised about the meaning of the term ―control.‖73  In response to these con-
cerns, Senator Grassley (R-IA) introduced amended language into the Senate on 
February 8, 2002.  The Senate approved the amended language on February 12, 
2002.74  The new language would amend § 202 of the Packers and Stockyards 
Act of 192175 by adding a new subsection (f) as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any packer with respect to livestock, meats, 
meat food products, or livestock products in unmanufactured form, 
or for any live poultry dealer with respect to live poultry, to: 
(f) Own, feed, or control livestock directly, through a subsidiary, 
or through an arrangement that gives the packer operational, mana-
gerial, or supervisory control over the livestock, or over the farming 
operation that produces the livestock, to such an extent that the pro-
ducer is no longer materially participating in the management of the 
operation with respect to the production of livestock, except that 
this subsection shall not apply to   
(1) an arrangement entered into within 14 days before slaughter of 
the livestock by a packer, or a person that directly or indirectly 
controls, or is controlled by or under common control with, the 
packer; 
 ________________________  
 73. See Feuz et al., supra note 47, at 1, available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/Lawrence/Acrobat/JohnsonAmendment.pdf (last visited June 
5, 2002). 
 74. The final vote was 53-46. 
 75. See Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 202, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (current version 
at 7 U.S.C. § 192 (2001)).   
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(2) a cooperative or entity owned by a cooperative, if a majority of 
the ownership interest in the cooperative is held by active coopera-
tive members that –  
(A) own, feed, or control livestock; and  
(B) provide the livestock to the cooperative for slaughter; or 
(3) a packer that is owned or controlled by producers of a type of 
livestock, if during a calendar year the packer slaughters less than 
2 percent of the head of that type of livestock slaughtered in the 
United States . . . .
76
  
This legislation, by its terms, is targeted to: (a) formal ownership by the 
dominant packing firms and (b) arrangements through which packers exert man-
agement authority over the production of livestock, though nominal title remains 
with the producer, to the extent that the producer no longer materially partici-
pates in the management of the operation with respect to the production of lives-
tock.77  Excluded are all forward contracts, marketing agreements and other non-
cash sales arrangements whereby producers maintain material participation over 
the management of the operation.78  Also excluded are joint ventures and al-
liances, except those giving a dominant packing firm ownership or primary man-
agement control over the production of livestock.79  Further, farmer-owned coop-
eratives and small packers continue to be excluded from coverage under the 
amended language.80 
1. The Meaning of “Material Participation”  
In a report commissioned by the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association 
and the National Pork Producer’s Council and released on March 25, 2002 by the 
Sparks Company,81 the authors criticized the ―material participation‖ language in 
 ________________________  
 76. See  S. 1731 (amended) (amendment S.A. 2837). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Carole T. DuBois & Kim Essex, Impacts of the Proposed National Ban on 
Packer Ownership and Feeding, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, at 
http://policy.dnsalias.net/sparks (last visited June 6, 2002). 
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the amended proposed legislation for not providing a ―bright-line‖ test for ―con-
trol,‖ and raised numerous questions about the meaning of the passage in the 
amended proposed legislation defining ―control‖ in terms of packer involvement 
in the production process ―to such an extent that the producer is no longer mate-
rially participating in the management of the operation with respect to the pro-
duction of livestock . . . .‖82  
a. The Role of Legislation and its Relationship to Administrative Law 
The criticism demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of the 
role of legislation and the relationship of legislation to administrative law.  Con-
gress has generally resisted such efforts to provide highly detailed and specific 
―bright line‖ tests, particularly when it has legislated with respect to issues relat-
ing to the structure of the economy or a specific sector or subsector.  As exam-
ples 
  Undoubtedly the most venerated statute impinging upon economic ac-
tivity in the United States, the Sherman Act of 1890, often referred to as the 
―charter of economic freedom,‖ which led to major structural changes in the 
economy, contains not one phrase that could be construed as a bright-line test. 83 
That act refers to ―[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . .‖84  Moreover, the act refers 
to ―attempt to monopolize‖ and to ―conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize.‖85 
That legislation has stood the test of time and has provided the necessary 
statutory framework for numerous price fixing cases,86 cases alleging attempts to 
monopolize87 and intent to monopolize,88 all without highly specific language in 
 ________________________  
 82. Id. 
 83. See Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-7 (2000)). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 85. Id. § 2.  
 86. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry.  Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 
(1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); In re High Fructose 
Corn Syrup Antitrust Lit., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Am. To-
bacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 
(1905). 
 88. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 
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the statute.  Indeed, the vitality of the Sherman Act has been its careful construc-
tion of a legal framework for evaluating economic questions of structure. 
  The Clayton Act of 191489 provided the first statutory framework for 
challenging mergers without mention of the four-firm concentration ratio, the 
Herfindahl Index90 or other ―bright-line‖ test.  The statute simply specified that 
mergers were proscribed that might ―substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly.‖  That language, with only minor amendments, continues to 
serve as the basic framework for evaluating proposed mergers. 
  The Federal Trade Commission Act of 191491 refers to ―unfair me-
thods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.‖92  That language hardly qualifies as a 
―bright-line‖ test. 
  The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 93 a very broad regulatory 
statute, makes it unlawful for any packer, live poultry dealer or handler, market 
agency, or livestock dealer ―to engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminato-
ry, or deceptive practice…‖94  Again, that hardly measures up to a ―bright-line‖ 
test. 
  The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922,95 another statute designed to alter 
the economic playing field, authorized producers to act collectively except where 
―the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced . . . .‖96  It is likely that 
some critics probably raised an objection and argued for a bright-line test then.  
Wisely, the Congress did not follow what would certainly have been viewed as 
unwise advice. 
                                                                                                                                    
1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Knutson v. Daily Review, 548 F.2d 795 
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). 
 89. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 
(2000) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2000)). 
 90. This is the so-called ―H index‖, so named for its inventors Orris Herfindahl and 
Albert Hirschman.  The index is the sum of the squares of the sizes of firms in a market, in which 
sizes are expressed as a proportion of total market sales (or assets, or employment).  See generally 
A.O.  Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 761 (1964). 
 91. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 310, 38 Stat. 716 (1914) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (2000)). 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). 
 93. See Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (1921) (current version 
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (2000)). 
 94. 7 U.S.C. §§ 192(a), 213(a) (2000). 
 95. Capper-Volstead Act, ch. 57, 42 Stat. 388 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 
291-92 (2000)). 
 96. 7 U.S.C. § 292 (2000). 
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The Congress in respecting the constitutional separation of powers, 
grants to the Executive Branch of Government the rule making power as well as 
the general enforcement power of such statutes, with authority to publish and to 
make final detailed implementing regulations.  Indeed, it is widely understood 
that Congress is not well-advised to enact highly detailed (and necessarily rigid) 
―bright-line‖ tests in this or any other area of the law. 
b. The Use of “Material Participation” Language 
The important question is how accurately the statutory language reflects 
congressional intent as to packer ―control‖ over livestock.97  The language prohi-
bits packer involvement in the production process to ―such an extent that the pro-
ducer is no longer materially participating in the management of the operation 
with respect to the production of livestock.‖98  The proposed amendment states 
forthrightly that packers would be precluded from dominating the production 
process to such an extent that a producer is no longer participating materially in 
management.99  Stated in a slightly different fashion, the Senate bill would, if 
enacted in the revised form, be properly interpreted as precluding contracts or 
other arrangements that reduce the producer to a mere laborer with no involve-
ment in management or a level of involvement in management that is not materi-
al.100 
The term ―material participation‖ has a long history in agriculture as well 
as in other sectors of the economy.  Each time Congress has visited or revisited 
this area, the legislation enacted has used language sparingly.  For example, in 
1956, Congress enacted an amendment to Section 1402 of the Internal Revenue 
Code to enable farm landowners to participate in the social security program.101  
The amendment simply referred to ―material participation‖ by the landowner in 
the production of agricultural or horticultural commodities.  Regulations subse-
 ________________________  
 97. 147 CONG. REC. S13,660-61 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001) (statements of Sen. Grassley 
and Sen. Johnson). 
 98. 148 CONG. REC. S601 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 99. See generally id at S601-02. 
 100. See id.; see generally Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the 
Farmer (and the Crop)?: Contract Production and Intellectual Property Production of Grain Crops, 
73 NEB. L. REV. 48 (1994) (discussing the perils of contract production in the context of grain pro-
duction). 
 101. 70 Stat. 840 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1402. 
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quently adopted by the United States Treasury have provided detailed guidance 
for that particular application of the term.102 
In 1986, Congress, in enacting the passive loss rule, made it clear that the 
guideline should be more demanding than merely ―materially participating‖ and 
so defined ―materially participating‖ on a basis which is ―(A) regular, (B) conti-
nuous, and (C) substantial.‖103  Again, Congress signaled that the test should be 
more demanding in the setting of passive losses and the regulations and cases 
have reflected that Congressional enactment.104   
The revised language of the amendment communicates clearly that the 
administrative agency with the rule-making power is expected to develop imple-
menting regulations but the message is that producers’ involvement in manage-
ment must not be diminished below a ―material‖ level.105 
The language employed communicates, as has been done before, how the 
rule is to differ from the ―material participation‖ rule used in other settings and 
for other purposes.106  The proposed provision would be in the tradition of legisla-
tion leveling the economic playing field dating back to the Sherman Act of 
1890.107 
Just as the language in the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,108 and other 
enactments since has demonstrated, divestitures have been ordered, mergers have 
been challenged and halted and those convicted of price fixing have been sen-
tenced to incarceration and substantial fines and civil penalties on the basis of 
something less than a ―bright-line‖ test in the basic legislation. 
Greater specificity is neither desirable nor recommended at the legisla-
tive level. 
It is noted that Iowa,109 as well as Minnesota,110 Nebraska,111 and South 
Dakota,112 have state-level bans on packer ownership of livestock.  The Iowa pro-
 ________________________  
 102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1402 (as amended in 1974). 
 103. 26 U.S.C. § 469(h)(1) (2000). 
 104. See generally id.§ 469; Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is 
Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615 (1998). 
 105. See 26 U.S.C. § 469(l) (2000).  History has shown that greater specificity by Con-
gress would be unwise, imprudent, and would diminish the life of the provision.  Moreover, it is the 
role and responsibility of the Executive Branch, not the Legislative Branch, to provide detailed, 
implementing guidance for such provisions. 
 106. See 26 U.S.C. § 469(h)(1) (2000). 
 107. See Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(2000)). 
 108. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 
(2000) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2000)). 
 109. See IOWA CODE § 9H.2 (2001). 
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vision for example imposed a ban several years ago making it ―unlawful for any 
processor of beef or pork to own, control or operate a feedlot in Iowa in which 
hogs or cattle are fed for slaughter.‖113  That language, while providing even less 
of a ―bright-line‖ test, has not caused problems in Iowa, a leading livestock feed-
ing state, particularly in hogs. 
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST THE LEGISLATION 
The meat packing industry and numerous land-grant university livestock 
economists have argued strenuously against the legislation,114 with their argu-
ments based largely on the supposition that the legislation would eliminate all 
livestock marketing contracts.115   
The major claims that have been made against the legislation are ad-
dressed in this section. 
Claim #1:  The legislation would make it illegal for livestock producers 
and packers to establish shared risk arrangements. 
Response:  Most captive supplies are not shared risk arrangements.  Ra-
ther, they are contracts tying the delivery price to either the cash or futures mar-
ket.  Price risk remains with the producer and is not borne by the packer.  To the 
                                                                                                                                    
 110. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24(3) (West 2001).  Minnesota takes the position that 
livestock feeding is engaging in farming and thus is covered by the corporate farming statute.  See 
id. at § 500.24(2) &(3) 
 111. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-2604 (2001). 
 112. See S.D. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 21-24.  On May 16, 2002, the Federal District Court 
for the District of South Dakota, in a highly suspect opinion, ruled the 1998 amendment an uncons-
titutional violation of the Supremacy Clause and the  Dormant Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  See S.D. Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. S.D. 2002). 
 113. IOWA CODE § 9H.2 (2001). 
 114. See, e.g., New Report Concludes Packer Ownership Proposal Could Cost Cattle 
Industry $3.5 Billion, NCBA NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, at http://www.beef.org/ (under Industry News 
Archives link) (last visited June 10, 2002) (quoting Terry Stokes, CEO of the NCBA, stating that 
the ―[National Cattlemen’s Beef Association] is opposed to the Johnson Amendment because of the 
economic devastation it could cause cattle and ranching operations‖); see generally Feuz et al., 
supra note 47, available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/abstracts/NDN0124.pdf (arguing 
that prohibiting packer ownership would have a negative impact on beef and pork sectors);  Steve 
Meyer et al., Prohibition on Beef Packer Ownership, Feeding and Control of Cattle: Comments 
and Discussion, Texas Cattle Feeders Association, at 
http://www.tcfa.org/LMIC%20Packer%20ban%201-02.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2002) (discussing 
the negative impacts of a proposed ban on packer ownership). 
 115. See Feuz et al., supra note 47, available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/Lawrence/Acrobat/JohnsonAmendment.pdf (assuming the 
legislation would ban any arrangement with livestock producers two weeks prior to slaughter); see 
also Meyer et al., supra note 114. 
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minimal extent that ―shared risk‖ arrangements exist, they do not violate the 
amendment if the packer does not own the livestock or exercise management 
control over the production operation to the extent that the producer is no longer 
materially participating in the management of the operation with respect to the 
production of livestock.116  In addition, interested parties could control risk by use 
of hedging on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
Claim #2:  The legislation is unwarranted. 
Response:  Packers utilize multiple mechanisms to strategically affect 
the market in their favor.  The motive and opportunity exists for them to do so.117  
Packer ownership of livestock is one of the tools that enables strategic scheduling 
to affect the cash price, and derivatively, the price of livestock procured through 
contracts tied to the cash market.118    The recent USDA/GIPSA captive supply 
report released January 11, 2002 found that 25% of captive supplies in beef are 
packer owned.119  In the hog industry, the packer owned portion in some geo-
graphic markets is extremely high while the national market share is estimated at 
nearly one-fourth of the total slaughter.120 
Claim #3:  There have been no hearings and no studies of the issue. 
Response:  The red meat industry has been one of the most studied in-
dustries over the past century.  In the 1990s, several studies from USDA have 
emerged on many aspects of the concentration, contracting and ownership issues.  
There have been several hearings in the Congress in recent years concerning con-
centration and competition in the livestock sector.121  These hearings have in-
 ________________________  
 116. See The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 
107th Cong. (2002) (amended); see also 148 CONG. REC. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002) (discussing 
the amendment to Senate Bill 1731 which added the prohibition on packer ownership). 
 117. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. 
 118. A report of the USDA Grain Inspection, Packers & Stockyards Administration has 
found that through contractual arrangements (forward contracting, marketing agreements and pack-
er-fed cattle), packers can obtain livestock two or more weeks before slaughter.  The report esti-
mated that a 1% increase in a packer’s inventory of forward contracted cattle on any given day is 
associated with lower prices (three to five cents per hundredweight) paid for cattle in the cash mar-
ket.  With captive supplies running as high as 70% some weeks, the economic impact could be as 
high as $25 to $50 per head of cattle sold.  Ward et al., supra note 38, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/packers/conc-rpt.htm#3 (last visited June 5, 2002). 
 119. See USDA-GIPSA, CAPTIVE SUPPLY OF CATTLE, supra note 7, available at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/captive_supply/captivesupplyreport.pdf.  ―Based on its review of 
the underlying transaction date, GIPSA has estimated that 32.3 percent of the total 1999 slaughter 
of the top four packers was procured through captive supply arrangements.‖  Id.,  
 120. See, e.g., MacDonald et. al., supra note 27.  
 121. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-948 (accompanying the 2001 Agricultural Appropria-
tions Bill, Pub. L. No. 106-387);  see also Hearings before the Senate Agriculture Committee (Apr. 
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cluded packer ownership as a significant issue.  In addition, a USDA field hear-
ing was held in Denver on September 21, 2000, focusing on captive supplies and 
packer ownership with regard to proposed rulemaking.  Further, there have been 
many studies of concentration, contracts and packer ownership through USDA 
and university sources.122  Packer ownership is one of the several aspects of mar-
ket power that has been discussed in those studies.123 
Claim #4:  The legislation will harm packer/producer alliances and the 
high-value branded programs they are working together to create, and will harm 
competition. 
Response:  Contractual arrangements and various kinds of alliances can 
contribute significantly to the development of efficient and competitive livestock 
production.  For that reason, the amendment leaves unaffected almost all market 
conduct except for arrangements whereby packers own livestock or exercise 
management control over the production operation to the extent that the producer 
is no longer materially participating in the management of the operation with 
respect to the production of livestock.124  All ―alliances‖ are thus permitted if 
these two caveats are not violated.  For example, a farm cooperative and a domi-
nant firm can jointly operate a packing plant as long as the livestock is procured 
through a contract.  The amendment also specifically permits non-dominant 
packing firms (that slaughter under two percent of the national slaughter) to enter 
into arrangements or ―alliances‖ with producers and own livestock.125  Further, 
branded programs are unaffected if merely a supply contract is involved.126   
                                                                                                                                    
27, 2000); Senate Antitrust Subcommittee (Sept. 28, 2000); Senate Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies (May 17, 2001) (on file with author). 
 122. See, e.g., USDA-GIPSA, PRTCE DETERMINATION, supra note 26; USDA-GIPSA, 
CONCENTRATION IN THE RED MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY (1996), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/pubs/packers/conc-rpt.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2002); see also 
SEXTON, supra note 27, at http://www.usda.gov/gipsa/programspsp/txpeer/RichardSexton.pdf 
 123. Most all of the studies have correlated increases in captive supplies, including pack-
er owned livestock, with lower and more volatile producer prices.  Economists do not have the 
proper tools to go beyond correlation to find collusion or intentional strategic behavior.  The evi-
dence is as strong as economists can produce.  Non-agricultural literature on industry structure and 
conduct informs us as to the conclusion that a prohibition of packer ownership is likely to improve 
the competitive environment.  See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 522-23 (3d ed. 1990). 
 124. See The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 
107th Cong. (2002) (amended). 
 125. See id. 
 126. There is no credible evidence that ―alliances‖ or branded programs will be deterred 
in any way.  In addition, large packers still would have available a full range of contractual oppor-
tunities to obtain specific types of livestock designed to meet specific needs.  Moreover, such con-
tracts could be drafted to include future delivery times and other elements that facilitate the coordi-
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Claim #5:  The legislation would have a large detrimental economic im-
pact. 
Response:  On one hand the dominant firms and industry apologists 
claim that the percentage of supplies packers own is insignificant.127  On the other 
hand, they argue that a huge negative economic impact will result.  The argument 
that the amendment threatens investment in quality control and market develop-
ment has little basis in fact.  Investment in quality control as to live animals has 
occurred consistently for years through education by universities, checkoff pro-
grams, third party agri-advisory services and packers.  Investment in market de-
velopment has also occurred uninterrupted for years through the same sources.128  
There is no evidence that packer ownership of livestock is either the best or even 
an appropriate method to achieve any such gains that may or may not be 
proved.129   
Claim #6:  The legislation would force the divestiture of some of the 
largest cattle feeding businesses and would cause a precipitous drop in feeder 
cattle prices. 
Response: The amendment is written to provide a divestiture period that 
is as generous, or more generous, than large divestitures arising under antitrust 
law in other sectors.130  Packers have 180 days to divest cattle and sheep and 
eighteen months to divest swine.131  Most antitrust divestitures provide for six 
months.132  For example, the divestiture resulting from the 1998 Cargill-
Continental Grain settlement with the Department of Justice provided for six 
                                                                                                                                    
nation of the packer and the producer.  Contracts that do not strip the producer of material partici-
pation in the management of the operation with respect to livestock production can still provide all 
the benefits of coordination and end-product specification that are commonly identified as desirable 
elements of current arrangements. 
 127. See, e.g., Meyer et al., supra note 114, available at 
http://www.tcfa.org/LMIC%20Packer%20ban%201-02.pdf (stating that ―packers own a very small 
percentage of cattle‖). 
 128. All partiesuniversities, checkoff programs, third party agri-advisory services and 
packersclaim credit for any gains therefrom.   
 129. Indeed, the prohibition of actual packer ownership of livestock does not raise any 
significant efficiency or competition concerns. 
 130. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice typically gives the parties six 
months to divest assets in a merger case.  The six month period begins when the court order of 
divestiture becomes final, which normally takes three to four months.  See ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 380 (5th ed. 2002). 
 131. See The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 
107th Cong. (2002) (amended); see also 148 CONG. REC. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002) (stating the 
effective date in subsection (b) of the amendment). 
 132. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 130, at 380.  
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months to divest several large river, rail and port facilities for grain handling and 
storage.133   
The claim that feeder cattle prices will diminish fail to take into account: 
(1) new entrants to the feeder cattle market who would likely bid to fill slaughter 
demand; and (2) the fact that feeder prices are tied to breakevens resulting from 
the cash slaughter market.  Consequently, packer slaughter capacity should not 
be anticipated to change as a result of the amendment.  If packers do not own the 
cattle to be slaughtered, they will bid for the feeder cattle to fill the void.  Be-
cause feeder prices are determined from predicted breakeven analyses derived 
from the steer and heifer market, it is unreasonable to assume that a drop in the 
feeder cattle market would arise or persist. 
Claim #7:  The legislation would harm cattle feeders in regions served 
by fewer packing plants. 
Response:  Because the amendment does not ban contractual arrange-
ments if the packer does not own the livestock or exercise management control 
over the production operation to the extent that the producer is no longer mate-
rially participating in the management of the operation with respect to the pro-
duction of livestock, packing plants could, via contract, still ensure a supply of 
livestock.134  Ownership interests are simply not the only (or even the best) way 
to obtain longer-run supplies and develop the upstream supply market.  In addi-
tion, if the plant is small (less than two percent of the national slaughter), the 
amendment does not apply, so a new entrant could use ownership as part of its 
entry strategy if such a strategy is deemed essential. 135  As to existing plants, a 
significant question is why they would seek to tie up supply.  One effect of such 
behavior is to make competing entry more difficult.  Such plants may actually be 
engaged in exclusionary behavior by exploiting a low-volume market where 
there is little or no competition, but if entry by other firms occurred, they would 
have to pay market prices.  Moreover, if a plant is badly managed and does not 
make proper provision for supplies, it may fail, but its assets will be available for 
another owner who can make better use of the assets.   
 ________________________  
 133. See 65 Fed. Reg. 15,982 (Mar. 24, 2000).  The divestiture period in the amendment 
should allow for an orderly exit from the feeding business.  Because cattle require a maximum of 
six months to feed from feeder cattle weight to slaughter weight, packers can be expected to merely 
consume their own product during the divestiture period while refraining from restocking.  The 
same is true for hogs which require five to six months from birth to slaughter.  There is a tremend-
ous economic disincentive for packers to sell cattle or hogs that are not at slaughter weight because 
the value of those animals prior to slaughter weight is very low. 
 134. See The Agricultural, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 
107th Cong. (2002) (amended); see also 147 CONG. REC. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002). 
 135. See S. 1731; see also 147 CONG. REC. S558 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2002). 
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Claim #8:  The required divestiture in the pork industry would have an 
even more severe economic impact. 
Response:  Again, the industry claims that the volume of packer owned 
livestock is insignificant at the same time assertions of drastic harm arise.136  Hog 
slaughtering companies have been extremely profitable over the past few years.137  
Producers have not been so fortunate.138  Additionally, the eighteen-month dives-
titure period for hogs is quite generous inasmuch as it is three times as long as the 
six-month period of time traditionally allowed in antitrust divestiture cases.139  
Dominant hog packing firms will have both the incentive and the time to maxim-
ize the return in the open market on their facilities.  Again, the important point is 
that once the ban is in place, firms subjected to the ban will have sufficient time 
to adjust business strategy. 
Claim #9:  The export impact would be severe. 
Response:  There is no credible evidence linking packer ownership to 
export successes.  The dominant economic factors in exports of products of given 
quality are monetary policy (strong or weak dollar), subsidies, tariffs, and the 
quality of private company marketing staff.   
Claim # 10:  The legislation will accelerate the move of the U.S. indus-
try to our Canadian and Mexican neighbors. 
Response:  Nebraska,140 Iowa,141 Minnesota,142 and South Dakota143 have 
some form of packer feeding prohibition.  Yet these states have maintained their 
 ________________________  
 136. See supra notes 127-129. 
 137. For example, Smithfield Foods reports in its 2001 Annual Report that it has aver-
aged 28% profit over the last two decades.  The report is available at 
http://www.smithfieldfoods.com (last visited June 19, 2002). 
 138. See John D. Lawrence, Summary of Estimated Livestock Returns: 1991-2000, Iowa 
State University Department of Economics, available at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/Lawrence/EstRet/ESTRET91-00.htm (last visited June 19, 
2002).  From 1991 through 2000, average net profit per head was twenty-one cents; 50.9% of the 
months were profitable and 49.1% of the months were not profitable. 
 139. See supra notes 130 - 132. 
 140. NEB. REV. STAT. Section 54-2604 prohibits direct or indirect packer ownership of 
livestock more than five days before slaughter, and has not been held applicable to any type of 
marketing agreement.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-2604 (Supp. 2001). 
 141. IOWA CODE section 9H.2 prohibits any processor of beef or pork from owning, con-
trolling or operating a feedlot in Iowa in which hogs or cattle are fed for slaughter.  The legislation, 
however, does not prevent a processor from contracting for the purchase of hogs or cattle.  IOWA 
CODE § 9H.2 (2001). 
 142. See MINN. STAT. § 500.24(3)(2001). 
 143. The South Dakota provision is contained in the state constitution as a 1998 amend-
ment prohibiting non-family farm corporate ownership of land or livestock.  See S.D. CONST. art. 
XVII §§ 21-24 (Supp. 2000).  On May 16, 2002, the Federal District Court for the District of South 
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packing capacity.  Stated another way, those state packer feeding prohibitions 
have not negatively affected the livestock sector in a manner that differs from 
states without such prohibitions.144    
Also, the Tariff Rate Quotas (―TRQ‖) currently in effect for imports are 
prohibitive.  The current TRQ for beef is 700,000 tons, most of which is filled by 
Argentina and New Zealand.  The ―fill rate‖ on this TRQ is 630,000 tons.  That 
means that any new beef imports coming into the United States will have a very 
high tariff applied, once the TRQ limit is reached.  
Additionally, Mexico is a grain deficit country lacking the feed sources 
to ramp up production.  Also, the traditional breeds of cattle that American con-
sumers prefer to eat would have difficulty surviving and thriving in the hot cli-
mate of Mexico.  Quality would be significantly affected by a shift to other coun-
tries.  Lastly, the USDA Food Safety Inspection Service is coming under increas-
ing political and citizen pressure for allowing imports of meat from foreign 
slaughter plants due to recent reports of unsanitary conditions.145  
Clearly, the competitive advantage for cattle remains in the U.S. due to 
basic and fundamental economic factors.  The risks and uncertainties arising 
from shifting plant production to other countries are immense.  If the shift oc-
curred, more opportunities for new entrants to the domestic slaughter industry, or 
growing small firms, would be undeniable. 
Claim #11:  The legislation increases the competitive advantage of poul-
try. 
Response:  There is little or no evidence of prospective harm to the red 
meat industry in relation to poultry.  However, it is important to note that neutral-
ity is often not the goal of legislation of any type when responding to public in-
terest concerns.  In any event, many of the dominant meat packing firms also 
have significant poultry interests.146  Thus, any competitive advantage for poultry 
among the firms in the industry will be significantly minimized or negated.    
                                                                                                                                    
Dakota , in a highly suspect opinion, ruled the 1998 amendment an unconstitutional violation of the 
Supremacy Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  S.D. 
Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D.S.D. 2002). 
 144. That is because the dominant factors in plant location are the availability and price 
of feed grains, and the availability of livestock. 
 145. Relatedly, the 2002 Farm Bill contains a country-of-origin labeling provision pri-
marily in response to such concerns.  See The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 
H.R. 2646, 107th Cong. § 10816 (2002). 
 146. For instance, in terms of share of the market, Tyson is number one in beef, number 
two in pork and number one in broilers.  ConAgra is number two in beef, number three in pork and 
number four in broilers.  Cargill is presently ranked third in beef, fourth in pork and third in tur-
keys.  Also, Hormel owns Jennie-O Turkeys, the number one firm in turkeys.  See HENDRICKSON & 
HEFFERNAN, supra note 11, available at 
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Concerning the argument that the legislation will cause harm to beef and 
pork producers if beef and pork lose ground to poultry, econometric studies have 
documented only limited substitution between beef/pork and poultry.147  Thus, 
any adverse efficiency effects caused by the legislation will be either nonexistent 
or not of sufficient degree to cause wholesale consumer substitution from 
beef/pork to poultry.  
Claim #12: A loss of animal feeding operations will yield a correspond-
ing loss of markets for grain production. 
Response:  There is no evidence that a net loss in animal feeding opera-
tions will occur.  There is every reason to believe that production by non-packers 
will fill any void left by the ―insignificant‖ volume of livestock that the packing 
industry divests over either a six-month (for cattle) or eighteen-month (for hogs) 
period. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The packer ownership amendment is a congressional attempt to address 
existing problems in the competitive environment of the livestock industry.  Be-
cause the amendment permits contractual arrangements between packers and 
producers unless the producer no longer materially participates in the manage-
ment of the operation with respect to the production of livestock, the claimed 
harms arising from the amendment are likely to be less significant than claimed 
offsets by the potential benefit to the marketplace.  If any negative market effects 
occur, such effects will likely be the result of packers exercising power over the 
marketplace.  The economic fundamentals, apart from strategic behavior, do not 
warrant such dire claims.  In addition, irrespective of the merits of the economic 
argument that contracting and alliances in livestock production are essential to 
efficiency and competition, the amendment’s ban on packer ownership will not 
bar producers and packers from entering into such agreements. 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.nfu.org/documents/01_02_concentration_report.pdf. 
 147. See, e.g., KUO S. HUANG & WILLIAM F. HAHN, USDA-ERS, U.S. QUARTERLY 
DEMAND FOR MEATS, Tech. Bull. No. 1841, Table 2 at 13 (Feb. 1995) (cross elasticity of demand 
for pork and broilers at the retail level of 0.0765, meaning that a 1% change in the price of pork 
results in a seven one-hundredths percent change in quantity for broiler meat). 
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VI. EPILOGUE148 
The U.S. House of Representatives did not include a packer ownership 
prohibition in its version of the Farm Bill, never having voted on the matter.  The 
Farm Bill conference committee convened to reconcile differences between the 
Senate and House versions, and observers recognized that support for the ban on 
packer ownership differed sharply between the two camerals.  Five of the seven 
Senate conferees had voted for the latest version of the ban on the Senate floor, 
while not one of the fourteen members of the House had vocally supported the 
provision, and a number of House members vehemently opposed the ban.   
On April 11, 2002, the conference committee held a public joint confe-
rence and debated the merits of the packer ban for nearly three hours.  Senator 
Harkin of Iowa, one of the measure’s co-sponsors, and Senator Conrad of North 
Dakota, defended the ban on packer ownership arguing that when packers are 
allowed to own livestock, they have greater ability to manipulate the market by 
pushing and pulling supply.  Senators Harkin and Conrad relied on USDA stu-
dies and academic white papers to make the point that they believed that the 
Congress should act, and not wait for more studies or investigations.  Not a single 
House conferee spoke in favor of the measure.   
The House conferees repeated many of the same arguments raised pre-
viously by the opponents of the ban, such as that the USDA has not found any 
causal relationship between captive supplies and price,149 the ban would flood the 
market with livestock currently owned by packers,150 without packer ownership 
farmers would have a harder time finding financing,151 the ban would cause capi-
tal to move out of the United States,152 the ban would have a negative effect on 
 ________________________  
 148. The text and footnotes contained in the Epilogue are drawn from both testimony 
transcripts of House and Senate Committee hearings related to the debate of the ban on packer 
ownership of livestock, and interviews the author conducted with Legislative staff members.  The 
transcripts and interview notes are available with the author.  Additionally, the transcripts are pub-
lished by the Federal Document Clearing House. 
 149. Rep. Boehner (R-OH) and Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) argued that they still sought proof 
on the causal relationship between packer ownership and price. 
 150. Rep. Pombo (R-CA), Rep. Lucas (R-OK) and Rep. Dooley (D-CA) raised fears that 
prices for fat cattle, hogs and feeder cattle would decrease as a result of the ban.  Rep. Dooley also 
raised concerns that the value of packing plants would also diminish with the packer ban. 
 151. Rep. Pombo (R-CA) and Rep. Clayton (D-NC) raised concerns that the ban would 
make it harder for producers to find financing because the risk involved in production contracts, 
where the grower raises hogs that a packer owns, is less than the risk involved with independently 
owned livestock operations. 
 152. Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) argued that the packer ban may cause significant capital 
flight from the United States. 
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marketing agreements and forward contracts,153 and the ban would force livestock 
production out of the United States.154  Most of the members of House conference 
committee members suggested that more study was needed before they would 
support a ban on packer ownership.155  Making his only appearance at any time of 
the public conference meetings, Senator Helms (R-NC) appeared to make a 
statement on how the ban would have a devastating impact on the state of North 
Carolina.   
At the end of the debate, the Senate conferees voted four to three to sup-
port the Senate provision and sent the issue to the House side.156  Conference 
rules allow only House members to request a vote on the House position on a 
particular issue.  None of the House conferees requested such a vote.  Thus, the 
individual House conferees never took a vote on the record. 
Days after this debate, as part of a global offer on the entire farm bill, the 
Senate offered to extend the time that packers had to divest livestock to four 
years.  The House offered to strike the packer ban and replace it with a presiden-
tial commission established to study the issue of packer ownership.  When the 
final conference report was agreed to, it did not include either the ban on packer 
ownership of livestock or any type of study or commission. 
On July 16, 2002, the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry held hearings on the proposed ban on packer ownership 
of livestock and the USDA’s enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act.  
Senator Johnson (D-SD) promoted the packer-ban legislation and re-clarified that 
it would not affect contracted livestock.  Senator Craig (R-ID), who opposed the 
legislation in the spring of 2002, made very strong statements of his belief that 
packers manipulate prices, and suggested more study of the issue.  Bill Hawks, 
 ________________________  
 153. Rep. Holden (D-PA), Rep. Lucas (R-OK) and Rep. Pombo (R-CA) argued that the 
provision might make illegal some forward contracts that producers currently use. 
 154. Rep. Combest (R-TX) argued that the packer ban in states like Iowa have caused the 
industry to leave the state.  Senator Harkin (D-IA) countered that Iowa hog numbers have remained 
steady during the more than twenty years that Iowa has had a ban on packer ownership of livestock, 
and that some states (such as Nebraska) have seen an increase in livestock numbers while a statuto-
ry ban on livestock numbers was in place. 
 155. Those who supported the idea of more studies or continued investigation included 
Rep. Boehner (R-OH), Rep. Lucas (R-OK), Rep. Peterson (R-MN) and Rep. Moran (R-KS).  Rep. 
Stenholm (D-TX) suggested that the House and Senate Agricultural Committees hold in-depth 
hearings on whether the Packers and Stockyards Act needs to be updated. 
 156. Voting to support the ban on packer ownership were Senators Harkin (D-IA), Leahy 
(D-VT), Conrad (D-ND) and Daschle (D-SD).  Voting to oppose the Senate provision were Sena-
tors Lugar (R-IN), Helms (R-NC) and Cochran (R-MS).  Although Senator Cochran supported the 
packer ban on the Senate floor, he changed his vote in conference. 
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the USDA Undersecretary of Agriculture for Marketing and Regulatory Pro-
grams, argued for additional study of the issue, and suggested the study be con-
ducted by experts other than livestock marketing agricultural economists at land-
grant universities.  The American Farm Bureau Federation testified in favor of 
the legislation, and the American Meat Institute and the National Cattleman’s 
Beef Association testified against the legislation.   
On August 1, 2002, Senator Grassley (R-IA) introduced into the Senate 
The Transparency for Independent Livestock Producers Act.157  The legislation is 
designed to complement the packer ban proposal.  The legislation requires that, 
by January 1, 2008, twenty-five percent of a packer’s daily kill must come as a 
result of spot market purchases.  The legislation applies to those packers large 
enough to be required to report daily live animal prices to the USDA through the 
mandatory price reporting act, and requires that covered packers purchase at least 
5% of livestock on the daily open market or on a cash basis by January 1, 2004, 
15% by January 1, 2006, and 25% by January 1, 2008.158  However, the legisla-
tion specifies that any packer that is purchasing at least 25% of the livestock on a 
daily spot market basis as of the effective date of the act is prohibited from re-
ducing such purchases below the 25% threshold (12.5% for packer-cooperatives).  
The legislation specifies that it does not pre-empt state law regarding packer 
feeding of livestock.  
Undoubtedly, competition issues in the livestock industry will remain in 
the legislative forefront in coming months. 
      
 ________________________  
 157. A Bill to Amend the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to Increase Competition 
and Transparency Among Packers that Purchase Livestock from Producers, S. 2867, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
 158. The schedule is reduced for purchases of livestock by a covered packer that is a 
cooperative association of producers by setting the applicable spot market purchase percentage at 
5% for the years 2004 and 2005, 7.5% for year 2006, and 12.5% for years 2008 and later). 
